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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM L. BEEZLEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Case No. 
vs. 
8287 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was originally instituted by plaintiff 
against the defendant based on slander. The words 
spoken were as follows; "That guy isn't honest and 
if he were honest, he would admit that she paid that 
money on the property." That the words so spoken 
were published to Ella H. Beezley, wife of the plain-
tiff and daughter of the defendant, on the 17th day of 
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July, 1953 a1~d reiterated thereafter on the 9th day 
of January, 1954 while the deposition of defendant 
vvas being taken in case No. 95289 Ella H. Beezley 
vs. William :Beezley, defendant and ;Elias Hansen, 
third party defendant. That after this cause was at 
issue pursuant to the respective pleading the 
defenda1~t filed a motion for summary judgment in 
the premises, and in support thereof filed his affi-
davit together with affidavit of Ella H. Beezley and 
the plaintiff filed a counter affidavit which placed 
the issue as to whether or not the defendant was act-
ing as the attorney for Ella H. Beezley squarely before 
the court. Further, defendant introduced at the 
hearing from the files in case No. 95289 the following 
pleadings; answer to plaintiff's pleadings denomi-
nated as Amended Reply to Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim and Supplemental Complaint, together 
with plaintiff's answers to Interrogatories in this 
cause. Thereafter, the court entered a Summary 
Judgment in favor of defendant, holding that the 
statement made to Ella H. Beezley by the defendant 
was privileged by virtue of the relation of attorney 
and client and that the statement reiterated at the 
time of taking the deposition of defendant was privi-
leged, and that said words so spoken on both of said 
occasions were not actionable. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in rendering the summary 
judgment herein, and by virtue thereof, plaintiff was· 
deprived of having his day in court, and disproving 
the allegations of said petition and affidavits attached 
thereto, and proving the allegations contained in his 
complaint of record herein. 
2. That the words spoken to plaintiff's wife 
injured and damaged plaintiff in his profession and 
occupation, and destroyed the confidence of plain-
tiff's wife which was reposed in her during their 
marriage. 
3. That this court should take judicial knowl-
edge of the fact that plaintiff was at all times men-
tioned herein as a duly licensed and practicing 
attorney at law, and further, as such, the statement 
spoken would damage and injure his profession and 
business, due to the fact that the same is based upon 
confidential relations with his clients and patrons 
both in legal and business affairs. 
4. That the statement so made, if true, shows in 
the trial of this cause that plaintiff was guilty of 
embezzlement, and fraudulently appropriated money 
entrusted to him by another, his wife, therefore the 
words spoken were and are slanderous per se. 
5. That the statement made to Ella H. Beezley 
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on the 17th day of July, 1953 and reiterated on the 
9th day of January, 1954 at which time the deposition 
of Elias Hansen vvas being taken were not privileged. 
The first statement was made relative to an account 
between Ella H. Beezley and this plaintiff, and at best 
the defendant would be acting as an agent and not as 
an attorney. The taking of the deposition was ad-
ministrative and not judicial, therefore not privi-
ledged. That in any event the defendant in making 
said statements exceeded his authority and scope of 
his employement as alleged by him and had no bear-
ing upon his duties as an attorney. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. Should be a part of the entire argu-
ment herein and will be treated as such, as it goes 
directly to the final conclusion in this case. As to 
Points 2 and 3 the same is well taken as a matter of 
law. We call your attention to the case of Harbison 
vs. Chicago R. I. Ry. Co., 37 S.W. (2nd) 609 (Mo.). 
"There is no question but that words de-
,famatory of th·e husband alone, spoken in the 
presence an·d hearing of his wife, would be 
publication. In that situation the wife would 
be a third person within the meaning of the 
law of publication, because the alleged de-
famatory wDrds would of been no application 
to her, and she would not be connected with 
the defamation in any way." 
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5 
Reading by blind man's wife of libelous letter 
written to him constitutes a publication, where de-
fendant writing letter had reason to believe that wife 
would read it to husband, and if such publication 
destroyed or weakened confidence of wife in integrity 
of husband, to such extent as to cause him mental 
anguish or loss of consortium, damages therefore 
cotlld be recovered. 
Lane vs. Schilling, 2 79 P. 26 7 (Or.) ; 
See also Fordson Coal Co. vs. Carter, 108 S.W. 
(2nd) 1007 (Ky.); 
Weidman vs. Ketchum, 15 N.E. (2nd) 246 
(N.Y.); 
Batten vs. Cox, 23 P. 1040 (l{an.). 
A statement charging one with wilful falsehood 
in a serious business transaction must necessarily ex-
pose such person to contempt and lower him in the 
common estimation of citizens, and is therefore 
actionable per se. Dvvyer vs. Libert, 167 P. 651 
; (Idaho). 
vVhere the words used have such a relation to the 
profession or occupation of the plaintiff that they 
directly tend to injure him in respect to it, or to int-
pair confidence in his character or ability, when from 
the nature of his business great confidence must 
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6 
necessarily be reposed, they are actionable although 
not applied by the speaker to the profession or occupa~· 
tion of the- plaintiff. When however, they convey 
only a general imputation on his character, equally 
injurious to any one of whom they might be spoken, 
they are not actionable .unless such. application be 
made.~ Sanderson. vs. Caldwell' 6 American Reporter 
105 CN.Y.) 
It was held ·to be .actionable, slanderous words 
need not be applied by the speaker to the profession 
or occupation --of· the one referred to, if- they- are such 
as naturally convey to the hearers a meaning appli-
cable to such profession or occupation. 
Pathangall vs. Morrers, 94 A. 561 (Me.); 
See A.L.R. 191-8 E·14·Ann~ Cas. 1917 D 689. 
As to the ·form- of statement used by the defend-
ant we· call your attention to the -case of Logan vs.-
Steele;· 4 Am. Dec. 659 CKy~,). 
"But it is again· objected. that the \Yords 
in question are not actionable because they 
contain no positive affirmation but are expres-
sive merely of the belief of the speaker. Were 
such- an objection to be ·sustained to an action 
for slanderous words, it would be easy for one 
who designed to . injure the character of 
another to effect his malicious purpose without 
incurring any responsibility by circulating the 
slander, clothed in expressions of opinion, or 
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7 
belief;.he might destroy,the-fairest reputation 
with .impunity. But. the law will not permit 
any· injury done to character to be without 
remedy by such an artifice as tl1is~ Whatever 
may be: the mode. of expression used, if an 
assertion of. ·guilt is· irnplied or intended the 
words will: be actionable~" "I am persuaded 
in my'conscience," is a.sufficient affirmation. 
So the expressioiLJ,- "I: am thoroughly con-
vinced;'_! "I thinlc or I dreamed it," ~,or aught 
I know.'' 
The case of ·Williams: vs. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661 
(Ky.) states the following:· 
''Actionable words are therefor of two 
kinds: ( 1) Those that are actionable in them-
selves, without proof of special damage or 
injury; and (2) those that are actionable only 
by reason of ·some actual special damage or 
injury sustained by the party slandered. It 
is equally clear that where "\tvords naturally 
and-· necessarily producing injury an ac-
tion must lie. But a third class of cases 
also exists where· the words,- though not in 
themselves such· as naturally lead to an infer-
ence of damage, do, as- a matter of fact, pro-
duce it, and in this case the person injured has 
a clear right of redress. Had the law of defa-
mation developed itself in what maybe termed 
a ·natural way the cases would have classified 
themselves under this head in accordance with 
the actual facts; but an arbitrary rule, intra~ 
duced in the law of England in the early times, 
has to a certain extent made the law of slander 
artificial. Instead of inquiring under the rule 
of certainty and proximate cause, into the 
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effect of the words spoken, the courts early 
layed it down, as a matter of law, that in the 
following case only where words slanderous, 
or actionable per se; ( 1) Words falsely spoken, 
imputing the commission of a crime involving 
moral turpitude, for which the party might be 
indicted and punished; (2) Words imputing an 
infection of disease, likely to exclude him from 
society; (3) Words imputing unfitness to per-
form the duties of an office or employment; 
( 4) vV ords prejudicing him in his profession or 
trade; C 5) vVord tending to disinherit l1im. In 
all other cases words spoken are either (a) 11ot 
actionable at all or only actionable (b) on 
proof of special damages. This classification 
is recognized. This classification is recognized 
in the leading case of Pollard vs. Lyon, 91 U.S. 
225, 23 L. Ed. 308. To sustain a recovery plain-
tiff must not only show damage, but the dam-
age must be the natural and probable conse-
quence of the words used. Field vs. Colson, 20 
S.W. 264 CKy.) ." 
Point 4. The words spoken involve the plain-
tiff's moral turpitude arising out of a money transac-
tion between plaintiff and his wife, Ella H. Beezley 
involving approximately $1,000.00. That it is claimed 
she paid said sum to plaintiff for a specific purpose, 
and plaintiff denied such accusation. That in the 
event such money was paid to plaintiff he would be 
guilty of converting same to his own use and benefit, 
which would constitute embezzlement. The words 
spoken by defe11dant went to the transaction as set 
forth herein and the deposition on file herein shows 
the defendant made such statement based on hear-
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say, and that he kne"v nothing concerning the pay-
ments of his own knowledg,e. 
Point 5. The summary judgment entered in 
this matter is based er1tirely upon privilege as claimed 
by the defendant, which alleged privilege is in dis-
pute, and at issue. The matter seems to resolve itself 
in the proposition of a party taking judgment based 
upon two affidavits and the plaintiff being deprived 
of a judicial hearing on the transactions involved in 
this litigation. As heretofore stated the statement 
arose out of a disputed account between plaintiff and 
his wife, we therefor call your attention to the case 
of Burraston vs. First National Bank of Nephi 62 P. 
25 (Utah.) \vherein the .court stated, "Merely to 
straighten out account" relationship of attorney and 
client, in ordinary acceptation of terms, did not exist, 
but attorney was merely plaintiff's agent, and state-
rilents by attorney in plaintiff's presence, expres-
sive of satisfaction with account, were admissable- in 
evidence tending to support defendant's plea of 
account stated. · 
As to tl1e reiteration of the statement by defend-
ant when his deposition was taken; the deposition 
does not become a part of court proceeding within 
law of liable until it is transcribed, signed, sealed 
and witnessed and transmitted to Clerk of Court and 
introduced in evidence. Thus such evidence is 
admissable to show that a communication Prima 
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facie privilege was made maliciously and whc11 sub-
sequent libel has reference to one sued on it will be 
admitted -as a necessary part of the res gestae. We 
think Judge Kanzly in taking the deposition in ques-
tion was acting in an administrative capacity and not 
in a judicial capacity. 
See Mannix vs. Portland Telegram, 23 P. 2nd 
138-144 (Or.), 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summing up the position of the plaintiff in 
this matter we respectfully contend that plaintiff 
should prevail on this appeal. 
First: That there was not sufficient showing to 
justify the trial court to enter a summary judgment 
herein. That said cause should have been tried and 
that the matters an.d things decided by a jury. 
Second: That the words spoken damaged and 
injured· plaintiff's profession, that of an Attorney at 
Law, which involves at all times explicite confidence 
between attorney and client. That said statement 
made to plaintiff's wife, was very detrimental, due 
to the relationship of husband and wife. 
Third: That the words spoken are actionable per 
se, and if not may be sued upon with proof of dam-
ages. 
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Fourth: Tl1at the alleged privilege is untenable. 
·rhat defendant iii making said statements exceeded 
his alleged employment as an attorney and had no 
bearing whatsoever upon legal advise given his client 
and would not in any manner come within the pur-
vievv of representing his client in the capacity of an 
attor11ey. That statements were outside of legal em-
ployment, and service to his daughter as an attorney. 
Fifth: That the statement made contained in 
deposition was an administrative function in the 
taking of same and was not a judicial proceedings. 
Sixth: That the statements arose out of an 
account between the plaintiff and his wife and at 
best the defendant was merely an agent for his 
daughter in regard to the same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. R. HuTCHINSON, JR. 
Attorney For Appellant 
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